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Libel-Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoeiation Inc.: The
Definition of Public Figure Is Narrowed
Since a majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed to
extend the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
to "public figures,"2 the Court has had to wrestle with the definition of
that concept. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association3 the Court
again faced the issue of who is a "public figure" within the context of
its defamation cases and took the opportunity to elaborate on the defi-
nition that it has been developing over the past decade.4 With its deci-
sion in Wolston, the Court continued its evolvement of a demanding
three-pronged definition of "public figure," a definition that will en-
compass only those individuals who actively involve themselves in the
decision making processes of society. It is now clear that before an
individual will be classified as a public figure for a limited range of
issues,5 that individual must meet certain requirements. First, there
must be a public controversy. Second, the individual must voluntarily
inject himself into that controversy. Finally, the individual must en-
gage the public's attention in an attempt to influence the resolution of
the controversy.
As a result of a probe into Soviet espionage activities in the United
States conducted by a special grand jury sitting in New York City dur-
ing 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston's aunt and uncle were arrested and
charged with espionage and subsequently pleaded guilty to the
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"--that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
2. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967); text accompanying notes
30-35 infra.
3. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
4. The Court discussed the "public figure" concept in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), and directly addressed the issue of who is a "public figure" in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See text ac-
companying notes 44-59 infra.
5. When the Court first attempted to define "public figure" in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), it divided the concept into two categories-those persons who are so famous
or prominent in the affairs of society as to be fairly classified as public figures for all purposes and
those persons who, while not public figures for all purposes, can be fairly deemed public figures
for a limited range of issues. See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 infra. Wolston, and conse-
quently this Note, is primarily concerned with the latter category of individuals.
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charges.6 Wolston was interviewed several times by agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation in connection-with the probe, and he trav-
eled to New York on several occasibns to testify under subpoena before
the grand jury.' On one occasion in July of 1958, however, Wolston
failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena. As a result he was charged
with criminal contempt of court, to which he subsequently pled guilty.
These events attracted the attention of the Washington9 and New York
news media, and at least fifteen stories discussing the events appeared
in newspapers in the two cities.10 After Wolston's sentencing, however,
the publicity faded, and he substantially succeeded in returning to the,
private life that he had enjoyed prior to his failure to appear before the
grand jury. He was never indicted for espionage.1
Nevertheless, Wolston was identified as having been a Soviet
agent in the United States in a book written by John Barron and pub-
lished by Reader's Digest in 1974 entitled KGB, The Secret Work of
Soviet Agents (KGB).' 2 Wolston brought suit in federal district court
against the author and publishers of the book, claiming that such iden-
tification was false and defamatory. 3 The trial court, however, granted
6. 443 U.S. at 161-63.
7. Id. at 162.
8. Id. at 162-63. Wolston previously had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the authori-
ties not to make him travel to New York again, citing his state of mental depression. When he
failed to appear, a federal district judge issued an order to show cause why Wolston should not be
held in contempt. Wolston appeared in court in response to the show cause order, and when his
offer to testify before the grand jury was refused, a hearing was commenced on the contempt
charge. Wolston's pregnant wife was called to testify at the hearing about her husband's mental
state, but when she became hysterical on the stand he agreed to plead guilty to the contempt
charge. He was given a one year suspended sentence and placed on three years probation. Id.
9. At the time of the grand jury's investigation, Wolston and his wife were living in Wash-
ington, D.C. Id. at 162 n.4.
10. Id. at 162-63.
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id. at 159.
mhe book contains the following statements relating to petitioner Ilya Wolston:
"Among Soviet agents identified in the United States were Elizabeth T.
Bentley, Edward Jospeh Fitzgerald, William Ludwig Ullmann, William Walter
Remington, Franklin Victor Reno, Judith Coplon, Harry Gold, David Green-
glass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, William Perl, Alfred Dean
Slack, Jack Soble, Ilya Wolsion, Alfred and Martha Stem.*
"No claim is made that this list is complete. It consists of Soviet agents
who were convicted of espionage or falsifying information or peijury and/or
contempt charges following espionage indictments or who fled to the Soviet
bloc to avoid prosecution .. "
App. 28 (emphasis supplied). In addition, the index to KGB lists petitioner as follows:
"Wolston, Ilya, Soviet agent in U.S."
Id. (quoting J. BARON, KGB 29 (1974)).
13. Id. at 159-60.
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defendant's motion for summary judgment, 14 holding that Wolston was
a "public figure,"' 5 that he therefore had to prove "actual malice" on
the part of Reader's Digest before he could recover,' 6 and that the evi-
dence raised no genuine issue of the existence of "actual malice."
'17
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the district court, 8 focusing, as had the
lower court, on Wolston's voluntary failure to appear before the grand
jury.19
The Supreme Court, clearly concerned with safeguarding an indi-
vidual's "interest in the protection of his own name, '20 reversed the
decision of the court of appeals2' and held that Wolston was not a pub-
lic figure22 and, therefore, was not required to prove "actual malice" on
the part of the defendants. The Court based its ruling on two grounds.
First, the Court disagreed with the lower courts' characterization of
Wolston's presence in the controversy 23 as voluntary.24 Second, it held
that Wolston had not "engaged the attention of the public in an at-
tempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 25
Prior to its 1964 New York Times decision, the Supreme Court had
clearly indicated that libelous utterances did not deserve constitutional
14. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
15. Id. at 176. The district court agreed that Wolston did not qualify as a public figure for all
purposes and in all contexts, but found that he satisfied what the court perceived to be a two-part
requirement for limited purpose public figure status, namely that he was involved in a public
controversy (Soviet espionage) and that his participation in the controversy was voluntary (he
chose not to appear before the grand jury). Id. at 174-76.
16. Id. at 176-77.
17. Id. at 79-81.
18. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. By failing to appear before the grand jury Wolston invited public attention and com-
ment. Until that failure occurred he enjoyed obscurity in the wings, but by subjecting
himself to a citation for contempt he voluntarily stepped center front into the spotlight
focused on the investigation of Soviet espionage.
Id. at 431.
20. 443 U.S. at 168.
21. Id. at 161. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, Powell and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion con-
curring in the result, in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Brennan dissented.
22. Id.
23. The Court did not specify the "public controversy" into which Wolston was alleged to
have voluntarily thrust himself. Because of its disposition of the case based on the other criteria
for public figure status, the Court accepted for the sake of argument that, as defendants urged, the
public controversy involved "the propriety of the actions of law enforcement officials in investigat-
ing and prosecuting suspected Soviet agents." Id. at 166 n.8.
24. Id. at 166-68.
25. Id. at 168.
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protection.26 In New York Times, however, the Court recognized that
the first amendment requires that some measure of protection be af-
forded to such statements, at least when they relate to the official con-
duct of a public official,27 and consequently formulated its "actual
malice" test.28 The Court reasoned that such statements must be con-
sidered "against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials."29
Three years after its decision in New York Times, in the compan-
ion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v.
Walker,30 a majority of the Court agreed to extend the "actual malice"
standard to "public figures."'3 ' Although the Court did not attempt to
26. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
482-83 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). See generally L. EL-
DREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 49-50 (1978).
27. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court elaborated on the concept of "public official" in Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), in which it stated that
the "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsi-
bility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
* * * Where a position in.government has such apparent importance that the public
has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who
holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees,... the New York Times malice standards apply.
Id. at 85, 86 (footnotes omitted). See generalo , L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, § 51, at 260-66.
28. See note 1 supra. The phrase "reckless disregard" used by the New York Times Court in
its formulation of the "actual malice" test was expounded on by the Court in Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), in which it stated that "only those false statements made with a high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of
either civil or criminal sanctions." Id. at 74. Later, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968), the Court said that
reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have
PUblished, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity.
Id. at 731.
29. 376 U.S. at 270.
30. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
31. Four members of the Court agreed with Chief Justice Warren, who stated in his opinion,
concurring in the result, that he would "adhere to the New York Times standard in the case of
'public figures' as well as 'public officials,"' id. at 164; however, Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court and joined bythree other Justices, declined to extend the "actual malice" standard to public
figures. He instead suggested that "a 'public figure' who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation ap-
parent on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at
155. The Court has since assumed, however, that Chief Justice Warren's conclusion--that the
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define the concept of "public figure," Justice Harlan noted that "both
Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of independent
public interest at the time of the publications,"32 and that "Butts may
have attained that status [of public figure] by position alone and
Walker by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his per-
sonality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy."33 Chief
Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion, stated that" 'public figures,'
like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in ordering soci-
ety," 4 and that they are often "intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions. ' 35 Then, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. ,36 a seriously divided Court,3 7 with Justice Brennan speaking for a
plurality of three, took the New York Times "actual malice" standard
still further and held that it applied even to a defamation action
brought by a private individual if the individual was involved in an
event of public or general concern. 38
The Court retreated from this "public interest" test, however, in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.39 Elmer Gertz was a prominent Chicago
attorney who was retained to conduct a civil action brought against a
Chicago policeman by the family of a young man who had been shot
and killed by the officer.4" Gertz initiated a civil suit for damages
against the policeman, but neither discussed the officer with the news
media nor played any part in his murder trial. Nevertheless, an article
published by defendant portrayed Gertz as being instrumental in the
criminal prosecution of the officer and contained various other mis-
statements concerning Gertz's alleged criminal record and Communist
ties.4 x In determining whether to apply the "actual malice" standard,
the Court specifically rejected the "public interest" test42 and held that
New York Times standard applies to both public figures and public officials-is the principle for
which Butts and Walker stand. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974).
32. 388 U.S. at 154.
33. Id. at 155.
34. Id. at 164.
35. Id.
36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
37. Among the eight justices (Justice Douglas did not participate), there were five opinions,
none of which was joined in by more than two other justices.
38. 403 U.S. at 52.
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
40. Id. at 325.
41. Id. at 325-26.
42. The Court stated:
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would
abridge this legitimate state interest [in compensating private individuals for injuries
caused by defamatory falsehood] to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would
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"so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private in-
dividual." 43  Significantly, the Court in Gertz for the first .time
attempted to define "public figure" and in fact offered several varia-
tions of its definition. The Court first indicated that individuals could
become public figures "by reason of the notoriety of their achievements
or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention."
44
It then stated that there are two classes of public figures:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions
of such persuasive power and influence that they are deem6d public
figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public
figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved.45
Later in the opinion, the Court offered a broader variation of this defi-
nition:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself
or is drawn into a particular controversy and thereby becomes a pub-
lic figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons
assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.46
Finally, in declaring that Gertz was not a public figure, the Court rea-
soned that "[hie plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome."'47
occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public interest"...
Id. at 346.
43. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted). In response to the Gertz ruling, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts now offers three possible standards of liability for defamation:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person,
or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely private matter not
affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is subject to liability, if, but
only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977).
44. 418 U.S. at 342.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 352. The basis of the Court's determination that Gertz was not a public figure is
not entirely clear. On one hand, the Court seemed to indicate that the public controversy involved
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Depending on which of the definitions articulated in Gertz is ap-
plied, the concept of "public figure" could arguably be quite broad,
encompassing not only voluntary participants in public controversies,
but also involuntary participants, 4 and possibly even individuals who
vigorously seek the public's attention regardless of whether they are
involved in a public controversy.49 On the other hand, the concept
could arguably be quite narrow, encompassing only those individuals
who voluntarily thrust themselves into a public controversy and engage
the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of
the issues involved. 50
The uncertainty created by these varying definitions and the myr-
iad of reasonable interpretations following from them was at least par-
tially diminished by the Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.5
By specifically discussing the "public controversy" requirement, em-
phasizing the individual's voluntary participation in the controversy,
and reinforcing the implication of Curtis and Gertz in suggesting the
presence of a third requirement of seeking the public's attention in or-
der to influence the resolution of the controversy,5" the Firestone Court
clearly indicated the concept of "public figure" to be a narrow one.
The possibility arguably left open by Gertz that hn individual might
become a public figure regardless of whether he was involved in a pub-
lic controversy was thus rejected in Firestone. The Firestone Court,
however, made no attempt to define "public controversy," except to
indicate that the divorce proceeding involved in that case did not qual-
ify.
5 3
was the criminal trial of the Chicago police officer, id., and that Gertz did not thrust himself into
that controversy. It is certainly true that Gertz did not thrust himself into the criminal proceed-
ings, but it is questionable whether the public controversy should have been defined so narrowly.
Indeed, the Court in the next breath indicated that the public controversy might be the whole of
the legal proceedings surrounding the officer, both criminal and civil. Id. If the Court did intend
to include the civil and criminal proceedings within the scope of the public controversy, its refusal
to classify Gertz as a public figure must have been based not on the voluntary/involuntary issue,
because Gertz's presence in the civil litigation was clearly voluntary, but on the absence of any
conduct on the part of Gertz that amounted to an attempt to engage the attention of the public in
an effort to influence the resolution of the controversy. This latter interpretation of the Court's
ruling is in line with Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Curtis, which commented on
the public figure's role in the resolution of public questions. 388 U.S. at 164. The lack of clarity in
the Court's analysis stems primarily from the mysterious concept of "public controversy." See
also text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
48. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The Court specifically noted, however, that in-
stances of involuntary public figures would be rare. 418 U.S. at 345.
49. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 45 & 47 supra.
51. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
52. See text accompanying notes 53-59 infra.
(3. 424 U.S. at 454. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, appeared puzzled by the majority's dis-
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Even more significant was the Court's treatment of the volun-
tary/involuntary aspect of the Gertz definition because, as evidenced
by several factors, the Court completely shifted its emphasis to volition.
First, Justice Rehnquist, in defining "public figure" for the majority,
selected what is arguably the most narrow of the definitions of "public
figure" offered in Gertz 4 and completely ignored language elsewhere
in the opinion suggesting that an individual might become a public
figure involuntarily. In addition, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
Mrs. Firestone's presence in the divorce proceeding was not voluntary
in that she was "compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain
legal release from the bonds of matrimony."" The final indication that
an individual's participation in the public controversy must be volun-
tary is reflected in language later in the opinion stating that "[t]here
appears little reason why these individuals should substantially forfeit
that degree of protection which the law of defamation would otherwise
afford them simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom. ' 56
Therefore, while the Court did not explicitly close the "public figure"
door on involuntary public controversy participants, a fair reading of
Firestone suggests that the Court implicitly did just that.
The Court in Firestone once again indicated that the definition of
public figure might indeed include the further requirement that the in-
dividual who voluntarily injects himself into a public controversy must
also engage the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the
resolution of the controversy. In addition to using the language "in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved" in its selected
position of the "public controversy" issue, commenting that "Itlhe only explanation I can. discern
from the Court's opinion is that the controversy was not of the sort deemed relevant to the 'affairs
of society,' ante, at 453, and the public's interest not of the sort deemed 'legitimate' or worthy of
judicial recognition." Id. at 487.
The Firestone case arose in the context of a divorce proceeding between plaintiff Mary Alice
Firestone and her husband Russell Firestone, a member of a wealthy industrial family. After Mr.
and Mrs. Firestone became separated, Mrs. Firestone filed a suit for separate maintenance, where-
upon Mr. Firestone counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.
After a lengthy trial, the trial judge granted the divorce requested by Mr. Firestone on the ground
that neither party was domesticated. Defendant, however, erroneously reported in its weekly
magazine that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.
Upon defendant's refusal to retract its false statement concerning the grounds of the divorce, Mrs.
Firestone brought this libel action in a Florida court. Id. at 450-52.
54. Id. at 453.
55. Id. at 454.
56. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
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definition of "public figure,"' 57 the Court made the following observa-
tion concerning certain press conferences held by Mrs. Firestone:
Such interviews should have had no effect upon the merits of the
legal dispute between respondent and her husband or the outcome of
that trial, and we do not think it can be assumed that any such pur-
pose was intended. Moreover, there is no indication that she sought
to use the press conference as a vehicle by which to thrust herself to
the forefront of some unrelated controversy in order to influence its
resolution. 8
It can certainly be argued from the language used by the Court, espe-
cially when it is considered against the background provided by Curtis
and Gertz, that the Court regarded the notion of "engaging the public's
attention in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved" as a third requirement for public figure status. 9
The Court's opinion in Wolston is an important refinement of the
definition of "public figure" in at least two respects. First, in light of
Wolston, it is now unquestionable that one cannot become a public
figure unless he voluntarily injects himself into a public controversy.
The Court repeated in Wolston the definition of "public figure" it used
in Firestone that emphasizes volition.60 Moreover, one of the two ex-
pressed bases for holding Wolston not to be a public figure was that
"the undisputed facts do not justify the conclusion of the District Court
and Court of Appeals that petitioner 'voluntarily thrust' or 'injected'
himself into the forefront of the public controversy. . . .It would be
more accurate to say that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the
controversy."' 6 1 Without doubt, volition is now an essential prerequi-
site for finding a person to be a public figure.
More significantly, Wolston clearly establishes what Curtis, Gertz,
and Firestone only foreshadowed-a third requirement for public
figure status, that once an individual has voluntarily injected himself
into the controversy, he must have "engaged the attention of the public
in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved,' 62 or to
use the words of Justice Blackmun in his opinion concurring in the
57. Id at 453.
58. Id. at 454 n.3.
59. Mr. Justice Marshall recognized the majority's emphasis on "issue resolution" and was
clearly distressed with what he viewed as a misconstruction of Gertz. Id. at 489 n.2 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Professor Eledredge also believed that the Court's language in the footnote indicated
that the Court was contemplating a third requirement for public figure status. L. ELDREDGE,
supra note 26, at 283.
60. 443 U.S. at 164.
61. Id. at 166.
62. Id. at 168.
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result, an individual is not a public figure unless he "literally or figura-
tively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular view."63 More spe-
cifically, the individual's conduct must be "calculated to draw attention
to himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public
.... ."I4 He must "seek to arouse public sentiment in his favor," 65 or
attempt to "create public discussion" 66 about an issue. This elabora-
tion on the language that first appeared in Gertz and was repeated in
Firestone-"attempt to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved"-is important because without such elaboration the language
appears to have little significance. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which an individual would voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront
of a particular controversy without attempting to influence the resolu-
tion of that controversy in some manner. Thus, before the Court's
elaboration in Wolston, it seemed that the only time an individual
could have met the first two requirements but not the third was when
the individual voluntarily entered the controversy and then became si-
lent. The opinion in Wolston, however, gives substance to the third
requirement by focusing on the manner in which the individual at-
tempts to influence the resolution of the issues involved. The crucial
inquiry is not whether an individual who has injected himself into a
controversy has attempted to influence the resolution of that contro-
versy because the answer to such an inquiry will invariably be "yes."
Rather, the crucial inquiry is how did he attempt to influence the reso-
lution of the issues-that is, has he engaged in any of the types of con-
duct set out by the Court in Wolston.67 It is this latter inquiry that will
make the difference in the determination of who is a public figure once
the first two requirements have been met. In fact, the Court's decision
in Gertz that Gertz was not a public figure is more readily understood
when this analysis is used. Gertz was an individual who could be said
to have voluntarily thrust himself into a public controversy, but while
he unquestionably attempted to influence the resolution of the contro-
versy, he did not engage the attention of the public in order to do so.
6 8
The import of the Court's elaboration on Gertz and Firestone can
63. Id. at 169 (concurring opinion). Justice Blackmun agreed that Wolston was not a public
figure but based his determination on other grounds. See text accompanying note 74 infra. He
objected to the Court's adoption of what he termed a "restrictive" definition of "public figure."
443 U.S. at 170.
64. 433 U.S. at 168.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
68. See note 47 supra.
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also be seen when this analysis is applied to the facts of Chuy v. Phila-
delphia Eagles Football Club69-a lower court decision handed down
shortly before Wolston involving a contractual dispute of a professional
athlete. In Chuy, plaintiff was deemed a public figure, and it is at least
arguable that he passed the first two requirements of the public figure
test-that there was a public controversy and that plaintiff voluntarily
injected himself into it. It seems clear, however, that he would not be a
"public figure" under the Wolsion analysis because, although Chuy ob-
viously attempted to influence the resolution of the controversy in some
manner, he, like Gertz, in no way sought to "engage the attention of the
public" or do anything to "arouse public sentiment in his favor."
Although Wolston succeeded in clarifying part of the "public
figure" definition, it leaves a very important question unanswered-
precisely what is a "public controversy"?70 The Court admittedly did
not have to deal with the issue in Wolsion,7' but it is, nevertheless, clear
that the existence of a "public controversy" is a requirement for public
figure status. That the Court continues to insist on this "public contro-
versy" requirement is puzzling and seemingly in direct conflict with
one of the Court's rationales in Gertz for its repudiation of the Rosen-
bloom "public interest" test. In repudiating the Rosenbloom test, the
Court criticized it for requiring ad hoc determinations by the nation's
judges about what was and was not a matter of public interest,7 2 yet the
public controversy requirement will necessarily require the same type
of ad hoc determinations.73
Wolston also leaves unanswered the important question whether
an individual74 who was once a public figure can lose that status by the
69. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
70. The Court did shed a light, albeit a dim one, on the "public controversy" issue in Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire, 433 U.S. 111 (1979), decided the same day as Wos/on. In Proxmire, the Court
simply indicated, much as it had in Firestone, see text accompanying note 52 supra, that the con-
troversy in question failed to meet the "public controversy" requirement. 433 U.S. at 134.
71. See note 23 supra.
72. 418 U.S. at 346, quoted at note 42 supra.
73. "The meaning that the Court attributes to the term 'public controversy' used in Gertz
resurrects the precise difficulties that I thought Gertz was designed to avoid." Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 487 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. There is some question whether the analysis of Gertz, Firestone and Wols/on applies to
corporate defamation plaintiffs as well as to individuals. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Eve-
ning Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 954-56 (D.D.C. 1976) (arguing that it does not apply);
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying
Gertz); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barrons, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying Gertz);
Comment, The FirstAmendment and the Basis o/Liabill/y inActions for Corporate Libel and Prod.
uct Disparagement, 27 EMORY L.J. 755 (1978); Note, In Search of the Corporate Private Figure:
Defamation ofthe Corporation, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 339 (1978).
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passage of time. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, obviously
felt such a lapse of time could be significant, and argued that
"[a]ssuming. . . petitioner gained public-figure status when he became
involved in the espionage controversy in 1958, he clearly had lost that
distinction by the time respondents published KGB in 1974." 71 The
majority, however, did not reach the lapse of time issue since it deter-
mined that Wolston was not even a public figure in 1958.76
The definition of "public figure" as it now stands after Gertz, Fire-
stone, and Wolston is a very narrow one within whose ambit very few
individuals will fall. This is unfortunate because, although the defini-
tion provides substantial protection for a state's interest in compensat-
ing defamed individuals, it does so only at the expense of the protection
afforded members of the media and others77 by the first amendment.
While there will still be instances in which an individual will be classi-
fied as a "limited-issue public figure" and thus be required to meet the
New York Times "actual malice" standard, those instances will likely
be rare, and as a practical matter the members of the news media can
expect to enjoy the protection of the New York Times standard only
when reporting on "public officials" and "all-purpose public figures."
Although a certain amount of protection is still afforded by the Court's
restriction on punitive damages78 and its prohibition against liability
without fault, 79 that protection will no doubt be perceived by the media
as insufficient, with the inevitable consequence that the media, faced
with the specter of a proliferation of defamation suits brought by pri-
vate individuals, will be discouraged from reporting on any individual
who is not a public official or clearly a public figure, regardless of the
significance to the public of the issues in which that individual is in-
volved. As Justice Brennan stated in Rosenbloom, "Fear of guessing
wrong must inevitably cause self-censorship and thus create the danger
that the legitimate utterance will be deterred."80 Such self-censorship
75. 443 U.S. at 170 (opinion concurring in result).
76. Id. at 166 n.7.
77. It is not altogether clear whether the constitutional rules developed in Gertz, Firestone,
and Woston apply to defamation actions brought by public figures against nonmedia defendants.
See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, -, 593 P.2d 777, 782-85 (1979) (holding nonmedia party
to Sullivan standard); Shiffron, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodol-
ogy, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915 (1978).
78. "[W]e hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at
least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 349.
79. Id. at 347. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
80. 403 U.S. at 50.,
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by the media may now unfortunately become the rule rather than the
exception.
JEFFREY PAIGE BROWN
